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5146字论文范文应急项目中的多组织协同治理策略研究

论文类型:论文范文
论文字数:5146字
论点:targets,perspective,projects
论文概述:

提高应急项目管理水平是世界各国始终关注的重点。当前国内外针对应急项目管理的研究主要集中在应急项目管理理论模型、应急项目管理体系以及应急项目管理量化决策三个方面。

论文正文:

问题提出

由于突发事件的发生,对国家、社会和公众都将产生重大影响,项目管理专家对突发事件进行了多方面的研究,并取得了丰硕的成果。米特洛夫(米特洛夫)、库姆斯(库姆斯)和其他危机管理专家以及影响这些变量的主要因素在路德提出的危机管理公司的四个主要变量中进行了研究:类型(类型)、系统(系统)、阶段(阶段)和利益相关者(利益相关者)[1];四个基本因素包括:预防(预防)、准备(准备)、表现(表现)和学习(学习)[2]。在此基础上,格斯(Guth)、希斯(Heath)、奥古斯丁等危机管理专家对危机管理生命周期阶段提出了危机前(Precrisis)、危机(Crises)和危机(Postcrisis)三阶段模型;缓解(缓解)、准备(准备)、响应(响应)和恢复(恢复)应急项目管理四阶段模型;以及减少(reduction)、准备(study)、响应(response)、恢复(recovery)和复原力(resilience)的SR模型,并包括危机避免和解决确认准备危机管理、危机管理、危机管理理论和模型,以从危机中获利,以及一系列危机的六阶段模型[ 3 ]齐梁明等人在当前研究的基础上对现有条件的分析。应急管理机制和启动项目机制,并将公共事件分为自然灾害、事故灾难、突发公共卫生事件、社会保障事件等四类[ 4】。MK将相关研究总结为:分级分类研究侧重于突发事件分级分类的事后评估、分级和分类计划以及灾害风险评估研究项目管理的三个方面,研究突发事件等级机制在应急项目管理系统中的制度设置,以及法律、法规、标准[ 5 ]。应急项目管理决策的定量方法和模型方法包括运筹学/管理学、基于博弈论的研究方法、复杂系统理论的研究方法和基于仿真的方法[ 6,7 ]。这些方法主要用于资源管理问题、疏散问题、应急预案、应急处置在线决策支持以及教育培训内容分析研究[ 8,9 ]。

In summary, the present study for the emergency project management approach focused on quantitative theoretical model of the emergency project management , project management systems and emergency response project management decisions with the model in three aspects . However, due to emergency project management faced with sudden , public , complexity , destructive , uncontrolled sexual advance , the uncertainty of change and development , and the impact of the disposal of the urgency of the breadth of features , which determines the emergency project management must have a battle uniform decisiveness , meanwhile , emergency project management process involves multiple organizations and departments , but also the behavior of the various organizations of the mutual influence , so emergency project management faces a fundamental dilemma of conflict , that battle between unity and multi- organizational collaboration disjointed decision of cooperation or mutually exclusive . Lin Song and other scholars from within the organization by nature demands , analyzes the main reasons causing these mutually exclusive demands from the lack of endogenous meet the conditions , namely the lack of inter-organizational boundaries clear authority and responsibility , the lack of clear incentives, and the lack of long-term problem partnerships and open information platform , etc. [10 ] . Zhang Lirong and other scholars have pointed out , \" how to mobilize the diverse social forces , especially enterprise organizations, non- governmental organizations and individual citizens to deal with the power of collaboration \" will be the focus of emergency management research project [ 11 ] . For this reason , the application of cooperative game theory, this paper emergency multi-organizational collaborative project management to analyze the conditions put forward a reasonable multi-organizational collaborative strategy to ensure the emergency room collaborative project management and more efficient organization , stability and continuity.
 Problem Description
Emergency project management processes and organizations with temporary , dynamic and one-time characteristics, these characteristics determine the emergency project management needs within a limited time frame , the use of temporary organizations operating mechanism through effective planning, organization, leadership and control , make full use of limited resources to accomplish a given set targets , therefore, from the perspective of emergency projects , project management is the core of emergency by building a stable multi-organizational collaborative relationships to meet the emergency needs of the project management process and achieves the project objectives, process to achieve these synergies is a process for emergency project governance , by its very nature belong to the scope of governance research project [ 12 ] .Emergency project management process as a project management process that involves multi-sectoral, multi-organization and conduct of the organizations interact and constraints . Government, as the core organization of emergency project management process can not be missing , often using its administrative means to influence the behavior of other organizations , but rely solely on administrative directive does not guarantee the multi-organizational commitment to emergency projects , especially in the organization of emergency in the entire project management process , and will appear in a dynamic , namely the organizations involved in emergency projects in the process, may exhibit actively participate , or to escape the threat of exit and other negative behaviors . Because in the social system is not sound environmental responsibility , business organizations involved in emergency projects consider their return on investment in time, might resources into other profitable projects, and using a variety of excuses to avoid or exit emergency projects , in order to obtain higher returns , therefore , all levels of government in the context of both the benefits and the overall efficiency of the participating organizations , in addition to relying on administrative instruction outside , explore additional policy tool to promote multi-organizational collaborative project will be completed emergency core problems. The above conditions must include the realization of synergies two aspects: a condition is to ensure that multi-organizational Select emergency projects ; Another condition is the rational allocation of guaranteed benefits of the project. Only these two conditions are met , in order to truly ensure that the organization \'s commitment to multi- emergency projects to be realized . As the core of the emergency government organizations rely solely on project management administrative instructions to be ineffective , the need to develop standardized decision-making mechanism to promote multi-organizational commitment to emergency projects. Emergency projects in a number of organizations , especially when the organization to be bound by the emergency project budget and other resources , to participate in the competitive behavior between organizations . But emergency project management process , but the needs of the organization in order to maximize the overall interests of emergency projects as the goal, to choose their organizational behavior , then the behavior of inter-organizational cooperation is called synergy . Therefore, this paper analyzes the use of cooperative game theory model of collaborative decision-making and establish a standardized mechanism to facilitate the completion of multi-organizational coordination of emergency projects. Based on cooperative game theory , this paper proposes the following assumptions : ( 1 ) the organization is involved in emergency projects rational individuals or groups ; ( 2 ) organizations involved in emergency projects through currency gains or losses weigh the pros and cons of each corporate earnings include not only monetary income , including reputation, brand , gain knowledge and other intangible assets , for emergency projects, revenue is more important intangibles . In this paper are measured using the currency of its value . ; ( 3 ) through participation in emergency projects , organizations will not get worse ; ultimate goal ( 4 ) of the participating organizations of the game is to get an overall efficient or optimal results , the results should promote multi-organizational collaboration. If multiple organizations to devote resources to other projects , or you can get higher returns in the form of non- cooperation , the above synergies will become unstable.
 Based on the above assumptions , analysis of emergency projects selected, if the organizations do not have budget constraints , organizations are often willing to participate in non- competitive emergency projects completed using cooperative game theory . If the organizations have budget constraints , especially the interests of the organization in the case of damage to shareholders , away from the emergency project may be the best strategy, for example , organizations with vested interests in the project does not meet the emergency needs of the organization , or participate in emergency less when compared to other organizations budget and profitability of the project, are likely to appear above. Therefore, this article will analyze and verify the following issues , which in the absence of budgetary restrictions, multi-organizational collaborative project was completed emergency optimal strategy ; budget in case there is a limit , when the multi-organizational collaborative emergency projects completed as the most when effective form of implementation in terms of a single organization may not optimal decisions , in this case, the analysis of multi-organizational collaborative strategy to fully satisfy the conditions of individual and overall best time , because the emergency projects to participate in all levels of social organization must assume social responsibility.
 Model ConstructionHypothesisBased on the description of the problem on a reasonable construction of analytical models , made ​​the following assumptions:
 Emergency Project participants do not exist commercial competition between organizations . In this case , a single organization to get the amount of revenue from the project is the simple addition of an emergency multi-organizational collaborative project proceeds . Because there is no commercial competition , increased revenue an organization does not cause a decrease in revenue of another organization . Of course , even if there is commercial competition between organizations , if only from the internal prompting emergency projects to enhance the efficiency of the organization , such as the organization of emergency overtime to complete tasks in a project , but the project did not complete the task by other organizations to draw conclusions benefits of this article also have utility . Therefore , the value of the emergency project can be considered the sum of the value of the project is completed by a single organization .
 Emergency Project for the value of each organization (value) is the potential of organizations gain / loss distribution determined equivalents (CE, certainty equivalents). Because the project expenditure during the crisis , it is assumed explicitly calculated for each organization to profit from each project is unrealistic . Therefore, if there is a gain of the organizations expectations , U (value) represents the value of the project value of the utility function , then U (value) = U (CE), U (x) for the utility function .Multi-organizational collaborative income less than the cost of the project , otherwise the organization would not choose to participate in the completion of emergency projects. The estimated cost of the project is the known number of emergency budget on this basis will clear emergency projects.
 Project as a sudden emergency project is an independent project , so the synergy between multiple emergency project does not exist. That multi-organization by participating in related projects will not obtain efficiency. Organizations involved in emergency projects considered in isolation of each project is to ensure that the organization is fully involved in the emergency project.
 Model Design
Based on the above assumption , the paper model parameters are set as follows :Let n N represents a finite set of cooperative organization , N = {1,2, ..., n};Let m and M represents a finite set of alternative items , M = {1,2, ..., m};Let Cj j represents the estimated cost of the project (or budget expenditure ) Cj, j ∈ M;I set up the organization gains obtained from the project j is Bij, i ∈ N, j ∈ M;I set the organization \'s budget for the Di, i ∈ N;I assume the cost of the project design organization j is Sij, i ∈ N, j ∈ M;Solve the problem raised earlier , that requires emergency organizations choose to complete the project , but also need to promote the completion of each participating organization and coordination . Therefore, only get to meet each organization \'s revenue from emergency projects higher than other projects, namely the need to maximize organizational decision-making objectives project benefits , in order to solve the above problems. Therefore, this article defines a mixed integer linear programming model , which is set Yj (0-1 ) integer variable , choose the best projects as indicator variables ; while setting variables Sij as an organization can afford the optimal value of project costs . This needs to clearly state that the value of the variable Yj and Sij is not unique. The project costs for each organization can afford not exceed the project budget , while a number of organizations involved in collaborative net loss also will not receive the above constraints will become the core of these problems. Based on the above analysis, a mixed integer linear programming algorithm as follows :Let S organizations involved in emergency total project , SN.The objective function : maxΣ1j ∈ MΣ1i ∈ SBij-Cj · Yi
 Constraints :
Σ1j ∈ MSij ≤ Di, i ∈ S (1)Σ1i ∈ SSij = CjYj, j ∈ M (2)Σ1j ∈ MSij ≤ Σ1j ∈ MBij, i ∈ S (3)Sij ≥ 0, i ∈ S, j ∈ M (4)Yj ∈ {0,1}, j ∈ M, if you choose to participate in the project j, then Yj = 1, otherwise Yj = 0 (5)The constraints ( 1) budget constraint organization. Constraints ( 2 ) ensure that the organization is fully bear the cost of each selected item. Constraints ( 3 ) indicate the organizations as rational organization, namely the organization \'s investment income is not more than the project . It should be noted here , as well as the number of items selected organizations to bear the cost of the project is not only the amount , but from the organization and coordination of the whole, its net profit will achieve the maximum. Problem-solving and more organizations choose project by applying the above algorithm is the \"first layer optimal results,\" while subject to constraints of cost allocation mechanism , will be \"second best result .\" For example , you can design an organization for all inputs to a particular project, the same amount of the budget , which uses sharing policy, or in a controlled environment by planning , investment income in accordance with plan members can cooperate with the provisions of the \"match \" budget. In this case , the need to define a constraint that the organization put into the project budget will not exceed the emergency response project benefits . Must also be pointed out that the excess profits of a comprehensive contingency collaborative project does not prevent a rational organization. Based on the overall efficiency, the solution comprising the above constraints , will give a \"second best results .\" In applying the above algorithm to select items , the organizations of the privacy concern. In order to obtain efficient solutions , organizations participate during emergency projects should improve the information disclosure mechanism. To ensure the authenticity of the information disclosure of rational organization requires incentive compatibility (incentive compatible) mechanism. Ferejohn et al study shows that when organizations still provide full funding for each project, while ensuring that there is no mechanism for effectiveness and incentive-compatible . Aloysius and Rosenthal Further studies showed that any incentive compatible mechanism can not be an effective solution . However, in the case of complete information , they made an effective cost allocation mechanism and illustrates the general method than the actual application of these mechanisms more effective ; But in the information confidential and not to limit the budgetary situation , although they also made ​​a incentive-compatible mechanism, but this mechanism was ineffective [ 13 ] . It should be noted that if the implementation of a clear cost allocation mechanism, because of its nonlinear integer constraints , leading to difficulties mechanism to achieve computing algorithms . Han , who gives a numerical example , but the scale of the problem requires inspired algorithms to solve real-world [ 14 ] .
 Emergency project selection game analysisNo budget constraint case
 Definition 1 : Any non-empty set of the players N = {1,2,3, ..., n} subset of SN, called the Coalition (Coalition), all league record for all P (N).Define 2: n person cooperative game (n ≥ 3) is the characteristic function is defined in P (N) on a real-valued bounded function v (S), where v (S) said that the league office by coordinating their S contains the strategy can guarantee the total human get transferable utility .
 A characteristic function can also be called a coalition -type game (game in coalitional form) or a cooperative game (coalitional game), abbreviated as v (S) or v.Definition 3 : The core (core) is the payoff vector satisfies the following conditions X = (x1, x2, ..., xn) of the collection :
 Σ1i ∈ Nxi = v (N) and Σ1i ∈ Sxi ≥ v (S), SNIf non-empty core game , it can be synergistic total utility v (N) assigned to each the players in such a way so as to not only meet the conditions of individual rationality and collective rationality conditions , and to meet the Union reasonable condition . However, the non-empty core does not guarantee that a core allocation (core allocation), because the game solution is a combination of cost allocation performed by the partners decided .
 Definition 4 : game (N, v) a super additive , if satisfied : v (S ∪ T) ≥ v (S) + v (T), the S, TN, S ∩ T =.Definition 5 : game (N, v) is a convex countermeasure , if the : v (S) + v (T) ≤ v (S ∪ T) + v (S ∩ T), then all S, TN.The above conditions can be written as:v (S ∪ {i})-v (S) ≤ v (T ∪ {i})-v (T), STN, i ∈ N TFrom the above equation , to participate in the league \'s \" inducement\" Union members will increase as the number increases , so when the game together will have a \"snowball \" or \" herd \" effect. Shapley (1971) proved that the core is always non-empty convex strategy [ 15 ] .Based on the above definition , we propose Proposition 1 :Proposition 1: No budget constraint , the game G = {N, v} in the characteristic function v (S) defined by the objective function of the algorithm 1 , the game has a non- empty core .Prove the following :Let STN, i ∈ N T; collection of JT = j ∈ MΣ1i ∈ TBij ≥ Cj, TN.If there is no budget constraints , and put the total revenue obtained from Union j S project is much larger than the project, the coalition S will bear the costs of the project j . If the organization does not bear the costs of collection T projects , the Union will not bear the cost of the project is also ST .Proposition 1 pair characteristic function v (·) is defined can be obtained:v (S ∪ {i})-v (S) = Σ1j ∈ JTmax0, Σ1k ∈ S ∪ {i} Bkj-Cj-max0, Σ1k ∈ SBkj-Cj∵ max {0, x}-max {0, y} ≤ max {0, xy}, x ≥ y∴ v (S ∪ {i})-v (S) ≤ Σ1j ∈ JTmax0, Σ1k ∈ S ∪ {i} Bkj-Cj-Σ1k ∈ SBkj + Cj= Σ1i ∈ JTmax0, Σ1k ∈ T ∪ {i} Bkj-Σ1k ∈ T SBkj-Cj-Σ1k ∈ TBkj + Σ1k ∈ T SBkj + Cj= Σ1j ∈ JTmax0, Σ1k ∈ T ∪ {i} Bkj-Cj-Σ1k ∈ TBkj + Cj= Σ1j ∈ JTmax0, Σ1k ∈ T ∪ {i} Bkj-Cj-max0, Σ1k ∈ TBkj-Cj∵ max {0, x}-max {0, y} = max {0, xy}, x, y ≥ 0, and x ≥ y∴ ≤ Σ1j ∈ JT ∪ {i} max0, Σ1k ∈ T ∪ {i} Bkj-Cj-Σ1j ∈ JTmax0, Σ1k ∈ TBkj-Cj= v (T ∪ {i})-v (T)
 Shows that , by definition , G = {N, v} is a convex games , the core non-empty convex games .When Proposition 1 reveals if the organization does not exist between competition , while not bound by the project budget , organizations can profit by leaving the alliance and , therefore, in this case, the multi-organizational collaboration emergency projects is one of the most strategy, as long as the inter-organizational collaboration using cost-sharing mechanism is bound to have a core allocation (core allocation).
 The presence of budget constraintsWhen multiple organizations for emergency projects have budget constraints , in addition to the value obtained by the coalition S is an algorithm proposed in this paper Proposition 2 .
 Proposition 2 : Under budget constraints , the project selection characteristic function of the game is defined by an algorithm , then the game may have an empty core .Prove the following :
 There are three organizations may participate in the project , including contingency , including three projects were recorded as an organization , the organization 2 , 3, and projects an organization , item 2 , item 3 . Specific parameters as shown in Table 1 , net Alliance as shown in Table 2 .
 Since the condition ( 6 ) and condition ( 10 ) contradict each other , so the core of these games is empty. This result indicates that there may be some cases , making the organizations cooperate to complete the project is not the optimal solution. Based on the definition of super- additive gains 4 disjoint union can get at least when the project is completed independently . It can be seen under the conditions of budget constraints , by improving collaboration between organizations , in order to establish a sound mechanism for multi-organizational associates , thereby promoting the completion of each organization and coordination of emergency projects. Therefore, further proof of Proposition 2 come under budget constraints , the need to establish a mandatory pre- contract to procure the completion of each participating organization and coordination of emergency projects. Although the project under budget constraints may select the game empty core , but this is not the inevitable result. Through the above analysis can help us to find a situation , making multi-organizational collaboration becomes the optimal solution.
 Let bj and d as a profitable organization and project budget from the project j in the reference value. The budget is a constant i can organize the reference value set by the product of d and organizational δi said . Δi constant willingness to participate in the project through the organization of emergency or have the ability to measure . For example , as an organization , can be expressed as a constant δi scale enterprises . Similarly, organizations can gain value i bj represented by the reference product with constant δi . Pay a proportional relationship with the organization which means that organizations gain from the project in the project. On this basis , we propose Proposition 3 .
 Proposition 3 : If you select the game in the project, to meet the following conditions :Revenue from the project organization i j,Bij = δibi, i ∈ N, j ∈ M, δi> 0 (11)I meet the organization \'s budgetDi = δid, i ∈ N, δi> 0 (12)The game \'s core non-empty .Prove the following :Let JSM said alliance S selected collection of completed projects and cooperation ; SSij (i ∈ S, j ∈ M) said the cost of the league to be borne by each organization for each project . One or more of these costs to get the optimal solution by the algorithm.Let SNij = δiCj1Σ1i ∈ Nδi, i ∈ N, j ∈ M.Σ1j ∈ JNΣ1i ∈ NδiBj-Cj ≥ ​​Σ1j ∈ JSΣ1i ∈ NδiBj-CjΣ1j ∈ JNΣ1i ∈ SδiBj-Σ1i ∈ SδiCj1Σ1i ∈ Nδi ≥ Σ1j ∈ JSΣ1i ∈ SδiBj-Σ1i ∈ SδiCj1Σ1i ∈ NδiΣ1j ∈ JNΣ1i ∈ SδiBj-Σ1i ∈ SδiCj1Σ1i ∈ Nδi ≥ Σ1j ∈ JSΣ1i ∈ SδiBj-CjΣ1i ∈ JNΣ1i ∈ SδiBj-Σ1i ∈ SSNij ≥ Σ1j ∈ JsΣ1i ∈ SδiBj-Cj
 Can be drawn from the above inequality , SNij (i ∈ N, j ∈ M) will result in a core allocation (core allocation), because these inequalities show that the organization defined by the SNij should bear the cost of the project is calculated , the Union S Net income will not be less than the income of S Union should get .
 Since the project required the organization to participate in the project budget will not exceed the cost of a large alliance of organizations , namely:Σ1i ∈ JNCj ≤ Σ1i ∈ NδidΣ1i ∈ JNCiΣ1i ∈ Sδi1Σ1i ∈ Nδi ≤ Σ1i ∈ Sδid, SNCan be drawn from the above inequality , organizations emergency projects undertaken by the project budget is less than the cost of each organization , so the above inequality shows that SNij is feasible.
 Based on the above analysis of the conclusions on SNij prove Proposition 3 is established. Proposition 3 the condition ( 1 ) can be interpreted as the organizations involved in emergency projects for the same driving force , because if an organization i profiting from emergency projects than other projects , it means that the case for all other organization also exists. Examples are as follows :
 Bij> BikδiBj> δiBkδlBj> δlBkBlj> Blk (i, j ∈ N, j, k ∈ M)By the condition ( 2 ) combined with the condition ( 1 ) can be drawn, if the organization involved in emergency projects i from higher profit organization k, then the organization should i k is more than willing to take the appropriate organizations , higher share of the cost of emergency projects . Examples are as follows :
 Σ1j ∈ MBij> Σ1j ∈ MBkjΣ1j ∈ MδiBj> Σ1j ∈ MδkBjδi> δkδid> δkdDi> DkIt is important to point out that the conditions set forth in Proposition 3 are strictly for non- empty core , they are a sufficient condition , but not a necessary condition. In general, the driving force only when different organizations involved in emergency projects , while the organization gains from higher than budgeted when emergency projects , project selection game exists empty core . At the same time , we can not weaken the above sufficient condition. For example: You can verify the order of priority conditions Bij> BikBlj> Blk (i, l ∈ N, j, k ∈ M) is not a sufficient condition for a non-empty core .
 Conclusions and recommendations
This paper presents a design and multi-organizational collaborative project completed emergency algorithms . Based on cooperative game theory , the use of these algorithms for collaborative multi-organizational collaborative strategy to complete the emergency project were analyzed . When completed multi-organizational collaborative emergency projects , collaborative strategy as the optimal choice , you must meet one of the following conditions :
 There is no competition between organizations , but organizations do not have an emergency project budget constraints.There is no competition between organizations , when an organization when there are constraints of the project budget , organizations must have sufficient driving force to participate in similar emergency projects while participating in the project budget and the expected project benefits proportional , that is, if an organization wants from emergency projects get a larger return , you must be prepared to put in the appropriate proportion of the budget.
 Based on the above findings, the project management process in an emergency , the government is to encourage and promote multisectoral , enterprises and individuals in collaborative emergency projects completed , you can refer to the following recommendations [ 16, 17 ] :
 Should minimize competition within the industry to participate in the emergency project management. The current emergency management process project, is still considered a simple organization and put more officers on the implementation of emergency projects more favorable , but the participation of many organizations , particularly companies involved in the industry have multiple emergency projects , because of business exists between the competing interests , or will have a negative impact on the emergency project management.
 In case of lack of financial investment , there are budget constraints , the government should be based on responsibility , ability and resources of different organizations and departments to establish mandatory pre- agreed or emergency supplemental approach. The current post- emergency projects usually recognition awards , etc. on the participating organizations and individuals encouragement and recognition to promote their active participation in emergency projects in the future , but only through the above methods can not meet the requirements for emergency projects , through the establishment of pre- scheduled to improve transparency , continuous and long-term emergency management system.
 Clear all organizations and bodies of the emergency project investment industry benchmark input coefficient values ​​and different size of the organization , and only by prior gains on investment and regulatory governance relationships , commitment to achieve proportional to the organizations and departments of emergency projects and the resulting benefits.
 In this paper, cooperative game theory have concluded , emphasizing the completion of the organization of collaborative emergency projects , the impact of competition on non- collaboration between organizations involved in the organization\'s budget constraints and emergency projects. The conclusions did not consider the following:Mechanisms for inter-organizational expense asymmetrical , which will reflect the difference between the emergency response capacity of the organizations .Inter-Organization \"vertical\" management relations between different levels of government departments such as the ; between the upstream and downstream industry chain enterprises . This article is only assumed that the Inter-Organization \"horizontal\" cooperation. ( 3 ) Due to the uncertainty of project benefits , collaborative strategy incomplete information will have an impact , for example , to deal with the risk attitude will play a role in this .
 Cooperative game when competition exists between organizations .Spillover effects of the process of cooperation .
 At the above shortcomings as a direction for further research . Despite these limitations, the findings in this paper for predicting the behavior of economic emergency multi-organizational project management , and the development of standardized multi-organizational collaborative strategic decision still has practical significance.